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Abstract
The Jesuit (and Catholic) educational tradition is characterized by a number of identity-conferring basic
positions that are incompatible with correlative positions on offer in the popular culture. Some of these
fundamental differences between the tradition and the culture are philosophical in nature in that they bear on
questions of moral truth and philosophical anthropology. Institutions of higher education committed to
forming their students in light of these basic and counter-cultural beliefs must ensure that the incompatible
cultural alternatives are carefully examined and the reasonableness of the Ignatian (Catholic) alternatives
carefully explored. The discipline Philosophy plays an irreplaceable role in this sort of tradition-culture
engagement. With this in mind, institutions of higher education that claim the Jesuit and Catholic tradition as
their own must ensure that Philosophy remains (or is restored to) a significant part of their core curricula.
Not too long ago I had the opportunity to work
with a cohort of twelve first-year medical students
at a local medical school. My task was to deliver to
these future doctors the ethics component of a
year-long course in the profession of medicine; we
would meet three or four times that year and
discuss the field of medical ethics. Although our
time together would be short, I was keen on
getting to know these students on a somewhat
personal basis. At our initial meeting I asked each
of them where they grew up, where they went to
college, why they wanted to be a physician, etc. In
the course of that first meeting, in order to gauge
their formal preparation for thinking about
medical ethics, I also asked them whether they had
any undergraduate coursework in philosophy.
Only three raised a hand. Of these three, two had
a semester-long self-standing course in ethics as
part of their undergraduate degree requirements.1
These two students, the two whose undergraduate
education seemed to have left them better
prepared than their peers to navigate the moral
dimensions of their chosen field, were Jesuit
educated; one was from the University of
Scranton, the other from Xavier University. I
offer this story both as a point of pride for those
of us engaged in Jesuit higher education and as a
way to emphasize the importance of preserving
the study of Philosophy as a distinctive mark of
this tradition. It is disturbing to see so many
colleges and universities proudly turn out future
physicians, nurses, teachers, attorneys,
accountants, etc. who are technically proficient yet

unprepared to work through the moral quandaries
that await them in their chosen field, and to
engage the great existential questions that life will
sooner or later press upon them. A core
requirement in this ancient discipline would no
doubt be a step in the right direction for these
institutions, and eliminating or reducing such a
requirement would no doubt be a step in the
wrong direction for Jesuit colleges and
universities.
While it may be the case that decision-makers at
Jesuit colleges and universities will continue to
ensure that exposure to philosophy remains a
distinctive mark of the education these institutions
offer, a “some Philosophy, any Philosophy”
minimalist approach to executing this
commitment would surely leave many students
underserved. Questions about what our students’
exposure to this discipline should look like must
be answered thoughtfully. The breadth of
Philosophy and the rather common need to fit a
requirement in this discipline into just one or two
courses require difficult decisions to be made.
Logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and
social and political philosophy are just a few of the
areas one might like to cover, and each of these
branches has subdivisions of its own. To sort
through the multitude of options and make
appropriate decisions about what all of their
graduates ought to know, a Jesuit institution
would do well to ask itself what it seeks to
accomplish by means of this element of its core
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curriculum. Wrestling with that question should
raise two other questions: “What do the Jesuit and
Catholic traditions—traditions that these
institutions publicly claim as their own—have to
say about the matter?” and “What feature(s)
should a Philosophy requirement at Jesuit and
Catholic schools operating in the early 21stcentury first-world share?” Such questions draw
the focus of decision-makers away from their own
philosophical preferences and specialties and place
it on two often-clashing outlooks on the human
being and the world: that offered by the Jesuit and
Catholic tradition, and that offered by the
dominant culture from which our students come
and to which they will return.
If Jesuit institutions of higher education carefully
assess and refine the Philosophy component of
their respective curricula in the manner described
above, it may very well turn out that their alumni,
including the aforementioned medical students
from Xavier and Scranton, will enjoy a common
philosophical foundation, one that will give them
a shared outlook, idiom, and way of proceeding as
they—separately and together—respond to the
Ignatian challenge to be salt and light in the world.
What, though, should that shared foundation look
like?
Cura personalis, magis, finding God in all things, and
metanoia are Ignatian terms that are employed in
much of the serious talk regarding the institutional
identity and educational aspirations of Jesuit
colleges and universities. These words express
ideas that shape our institutions and are frequently
offered as ultimate justifications for policies and
practices in all areas of institutional life. These
ideas shape how we seek to shape our students.
Yet what sometimes goes unnoticed in this
Ignatian educational discourse is that these words
and phrases are philosophically heavy; heavy in
what they presuppose and heavy in what they call
those committed to this tradition to do (and not
to do). Were they to be evacuated of this deeper
philosophical meaning, these terms might be
reduced to vague, cost-free clichés that give an
Ignatian luster to all sorts of policies and
proposals that are appealing for any number of
other reasons, while demanding little of those who
invoke them and offering no guidance to students
exposed to them. Here is where Philosophy has an
important role to play.

There are certain cultural tendencies, perhaps precritical habits of thought, that bump up against the
foundational, philosophically substantive
commitments of the Ignatian worldview. A
student who has been well grounded in
Philosophy and who appreciates the philosophical
dimensions of these Ignatian commitments will be
prepared to go into the world, challenge these
“errors of the age,” and offer a better alternative.
In doing so these men and women can change the
world in ways that others cannot, taking what has
been passed on to them by the Jesuit tradition and
offering it to their coworkers, their family, their
friends, their neighbors. Indeed, the right kind of
philosophical background can empower these
graduates to become links in a chain that stretches
back for centuries and which, through them, will
reach into the future.
But what are these “errors of the age” and how
do they philosophically bump up against the
aforementioned ideas at the heart of Jesuit
education? In what follows, I offer three. There
are no doubt more, and maybe even some that are
more profound than the three I examine, but the
three I identify are at work in our students’ basic
outlook and, at the same time, are deeply at odds
with the basic commitments of the Ignatian
tradition that we call our own and promise to pass
on to our students. The three ideas that I speak of
are materialism, individualism, and relativism.
*
The “materialism” in play here is metaphysical
materialism. Let this phrase stand for what Thomas
Nagel describes as
a comprehensive, speculative world
picture that is reached by extrapolation
from some of the discoveries of biology,
chemistry, and physics—a particular
naturalistic Weltanschauung that postulates
a hierarchical relation among the subjects
of those sciences, and the completeness
in principle of an explanation of
everything in the universe through their
unification.2
Nagel’s words lay out well the grand idea behind
what so many students accept as the starting point
and reasonable parameters for all serious inquiry
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regarding the human person, namely, that
everything “really real” about us is fully
explainable by reference to our material
constituents. The belief is that human beings are
merely biological creatures, and that the whole of
one’s interior life—deliberating, willing, hoping,
loving, wondering, worshipping, etc.—is in reality
only a complex nexus of biological phenomena.
For so many students this is the presumptivelytrue background account of the human being; the
solid ground upon which serious-minded people
stride.3 While our culture, including our students,
may not have this background anthropology laid
out in their minds as elaborately as Nagel’s
formulation, it is nevertheless the case that so
many believe it to be true. Why is this so?
The materialism uncritically adopted by so many
of our students appears to be allied with the
epistemological principle, also uncritically
adopted, that only “scientific” knowledge is
authentic knowledge. These metaphysical and
epistemological commitments underwrite the
principle that all and only the deliverances of
“science” are to be accepted as features of
objective reality.4 A worldview hangs on this
principle; the difference between the propositions
Science gives us knowledge of part of reality and Science
alone determines what is real is profound. The latter
leaves no room for any matter-independent
dimension to reality, and so belief in a soul, God,
and free will, that is, belief that these are really real
despite being empirically undetectable, becomes
intellectually disreputable and thus somewhat
embarrassing in serious public conversation. While
many do believe in such things, these beliefs bear
the taint of a dubious provenance given that they
are based not upon science but upon the softer
ground composed of some mixture of blind faith,
upbringing (which means, to some critics,
indoctrination), and/or a personal (read purely
subjective) experience. While students may support
a certain amount of public space for one “to
personally believe” in such things, the consensus
view seems to be that these beliefs cannot rise to
the status of knowledge because the requisite
empirical justification is, by the very nature of the
objects in question, unavailable.5
It is not difficult to see how this account of what
is real conflicts with the Ignatian ideas of cura
personalis, magis, finding God in all things, and metanoia.

It makes them all to be, at best, ennobling cultural
myth and, at worst, naive nonsense. What exactly
is an attitude of “care” in this worldview? What
are aspirations for “the greater” on this account of
the human being? For that matter, what is the
measure of the good, the greater, the lesser? What
is a “mind” here, and what does it mean to seek a
transformation of self? And what a fool’s errand it
is to try to find God in anything, let alone in all
things. If metaphysical materialism is true, then
the foundational commitments and animating
aspirations of the entire Ignatian educational
tradition are—to put it in the most philosophically
charitable words—held without warrant.
Philosophy, however, has something to say on
behalf of the philosophical anthropology that the
Jesuit and Catholic tradition offers. Consider Pope
Emeritus Benedict XVI’s observation that freedom,
love, and evil are “three themes fundamental to
human existence.”6 Consider, too, the late 20th
century Catholic writer Walker Percy’s
observation that
[t]his life is much too much trouble, far
too strange, to arrive at the end of it and
then be asked what you make of it and
have to answer, ‘Scientific humanism.’
That won’t do. A poor show.7
Finally, consider Walt Whitman’s experience that
“a morning-glory at my window satisfies me more
than the metaphysics of books.”8 Taken together,
these three (of countless) examples manifest the
remarkable human capacity to engage in serious
philosophical reflection about a wide range of
experiences, and to be conscious of oneself
engaging in such reflections. Yet all of these
activities and experiences are among the data that
must be explained, and explained well, by any
account of the human being that claims to be
complete and credible. Graduates of institutions
that place themselves within the Jesuit and
Catholic tradition ought to have considered
carefully a slew of interrelated philosophical
questions provoked by these authors’ words. This
tradition is rich with thinkers and texts that model
such careful introspection, like St. Augustine’s 5th
century Confessions and St. John Paul II’s 20th
century personalism.9 One recurring philosophical
question of particular importance here is whether
materialism offers a sufficient explanation—that
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is, a complete and credible account—for the wide
variety of activities and experiences that fill the
student’s daily life. The problematic explanatory
gap between a third-person objective account of
their life as an organism and their inescapably
first-person experiences as a self in the world
should be familiar territory to them.
Furthermore, while considering accounts that
purport to fill this explanatory gap, students
should also understand well the inherent weakness
of the often-assumed but less-often examined
principle that only empirical explanations are
acceptable. As contemporary philosopher Edward
Feser points out, that kind of popular, pre-critical
scientism is either self-defeating or trivially true.
The proposition Only scientific knowledge is authentic
knowledge is not itself scientifically (“scientifically”
understood here in a narrow sense of
“empirically”) verifiable, and thus the principle
eliminates itself. If one were to avoid this
difficulty by expanding the meaning of “scientific
knowledge” to include any conclusion drawn by
means of reasoning from observed data (including
first-person data introspectively observed) to
unobserved proportionate causes, then the
improved statement would become rather less
controversial and, more to the point, unable to
ground a peremptory dismissal of the
metaphysical presuppositions behind the Ignatian
ideals we have been considering.10
*
Individualism is another cultural error that bumps
up against the accounts of the person, the world,
and God that underlie well-known Ignatian
commitments. As with materialism, it is likely the
case that many students at Jesuit institutions have
uncritically adopted this basic stance from the
culture rather than appropriated it as their own
after a careful philosophical examination of its
foundations and implications. The individualism
in question here identifies the subject as the
uncontested criterion of just about everything that
has anything to do with the good for oneself and
the kind of life one chooses to lead. This cultural
norm leaves little room for anything other than
oneself to question the truth of one’s judgments
bearing upon such matters. Almost thirty years
ago philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre described this
cultural shift as heading in the direction of “the

privatization of the good.”11 Two years later the
Supreme Court of the United States gave voice
and heft to this outlook by proclaiming that “at
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.”12
The more recent phenomenon of publicly
identifying as something other than what one
manifestly is, and the mutually-affirming
narcissism that characterizes much of social
media, are perhaps symptoms of this elevation and
acceptance of the self as the unquestioned final
criterion for answers to an ever-widening set of
questions. The commonplace invocation of the
principle of autonomy as the (putatively) supreme
principle that ought to settle so many morally
significant public policy questions (e.g., those
regarding access to abortion, physician-assisted
suicide, and pornography) both reflects and
reinforces this tendency. One notable
manifestation of the sort of individualism in
question here can be found in the area of
reproductive technology. The laboratory
production of a child according to the preferences
of the parent(s) is a widely accepted project which
regularly includes the discarding of other
laboratory-generated embryos who do not fit the
desired profile. Furthermore, this desired profile
may be one that includes a disability. In some
cases the production of the preferred kind of child
may involve not only the selection of an embryo
with a certain disability, but also the subsequent
choice by the parent(s) not to mitigate the
disability by means of available and effective
therapies.13 What morally underwrites this practice
(insofar as it is ever seriously challenged) are
individualized, subjective accounts of health and
disability that are grounded not in the nature of the
thing (that is, in the proper functioning of the
organs and systems of the human being) but in the
preferences of the parent(s).14 As suggested earlier,
a similar autonomy-heavy, individualistic approach
to the value of life is found in the standard cases
in favor of rights to abortion and physicianassisted suicide.15
Students emerging from institutions of higher
education that claim the Jesuit and Catholic
traditions as their own ought to be prepared to
challenge philosophically our culture’s habitual
and seemingly rarely examined elevation of the
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individual. Philosophy does have the resources to
lay bare and push back against what so many
students seem to take for granted, namely, that
each person is alone competent to craft his or her
own answers to the basic questions, “What am
I?”, “What is the value of my life?”, and “How
ought I live?”, and that such self-constitution is
best done free of any unwanted baggage that
family, community, and tradition would offer as
guidance. Contemporary philosophers Peter
Singer and Alasdair MacIntyre, despite widely
divergent views on many important issues, each
call attention to the eminently contestable
philosophical anthropology that is suggested by
this cultural orthodoxy. Singer finds the idea of
the “independent individual” to be “unhistorical,
abstract and ultimately inexplicable.”16 MacIntyre
elaborates, pointing to some indisputable facts
about each of us:
We find ourselves placed at some
particular point within a network of
relationships of giving and receiving in
which, generally and characteristically,
what and how far we are able to give
depends in part on what and how far we
received…. So understood, the
relationships from which the independent
practical reasoner emerges and through
which she or he continues to be sustained
are such that from the outset she or he is
in debt.17
With each human being having been utterly at the
mercy of, and shaped by, particular families,
communities, and traditions, the idea of the
independent individual on offer in our culture is a
fiction, an impoverished account of the concrete
person. MacIntyre also points to certain recurring
patterns that are no doubt to be found in each
student’s life and that generate certain basic
commitments that are neither revocable nor
conditioned upon one’s changeable preferences:
And the kind of care that was needed to
make us what we have in fact
become…had to be, if it was to be
effective, unconditional care for the
human being as such, whatever the
outcome. And this is the kind of care that
we in turn now owe or will owe.18

The challenge to the individualism of the day
offered by just these two philosophers is
substantial and sophisticated, and there is more
where it came from. Our graduates should know
these challenges well.
Perhaps some students have moved past the sort
of inchoate individualism in question here and
endorse some form of libertarianism. Their strand
of individualism may be one that follows the spirit
of Ayn Rand, whose character John Galt declares
“I swear, by my life and my love of it, that I will
never live for the sake of another man, nor ask
another man to live for mine.”19 Rand believed
that “[i]f any civilization is to survive, it is the
morality of altruism that men have to reject.”20 At
the heart of this posture towards the world stands
the atomic individual, and the development of
civilization is to be measured in terms of its
“progress toward a society of privacy.”21 Yet, as
with the aforementioned brand of individualism,
this notion of the human being and this account
of progress seems conceptually incompatible with
the Ignatian ideal of cura personalis as a legitimate
and authoritative call to serve the authentic wellbeing of others. The great distance between the
ideals of Rand and those of Ignatius is made
manifest simply by attending to the sort of
metanoia that each calls for. Here again, Philosophy
has something important to say. For example,
Robert George, a contemporary public intellectual
who has spent a career philosophically articulating
and defending elements of the moral worldview
which Jesuit colleges and universities claim as their
own, explains that libertarianism
affirms a genuine truth—in this case, the
value and importance of liberty or
personal autonomy—but affirms it so
emphatically and indeed single-mindedly
that it winds up denying other equally
important truths and values.
Libertarianism of the Ayn Randian sort
emphasizes individualism so strongly that
it ends up treating human sociability and
the values connected to it (e.g., friendship,
marriage, community, solidarity) as purely
instrumental goods, rather than intrinsic
and constitutive aspects of human wellbeing and fulfillment. The value of human
relationships and associations is reduced
to their utility and efficiency in enabling
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the partners or members to achieve their
individual goals.22
George, MacIntyre, and Singer are just a few
notable philosophers who offer a reasoned
critique of, and plausible alternative to, the
individualism that characterizes so much of
contemporary culture, the culture from which our
students come and to which they shall return. The
insights that these and other philosophers offer
are grounded in reason and other common
elements of the lived experience of these students.
This lived experience, together with the kind of
sustained critical reflection that characterizes
Philosophy, can provide an oft-missing measure
of rational depth and force to the Ignatian ideals
that shape the identity and characteristic discourse
of Jesuit colleges and universities. In this way,
Philosophy offers an irreplaceable contribution to
our tradition’s case that the individualism of the
day does not withstand scrutiny, and that the
obligations related to cura personalis and being men
and women for others are more than mere
sentiment. This case, grounded as it is in reason
and common experience, may travel well as the
students leave our institutions and re-enter the
world.
*
In addition to materialism and individualism,
moral relativism—the belief that there are no
objective moral truths to be known—is a
background belief that so many students bring
with them into our classrooms. This belief is to be
distinguished from the idea that moral truths are
difficult to discern but are, at least in principle,
knowable (like, for instance, the truths of particle
physics). The underlying metaphysical position is
simple: there is no moral dimension to reality that
one can know in the robust sense of this term. As
with the other two background beliefs already
discussed, our students’ commitment to this kind
of relativism seems not to have been borne of
careful and sustained philosophical deliberation.
Most students seem to take for granted that one
can, with persistent and careful study, correctly
grasp the nature of quarks and stars and viruses
and gravity. These things are, in a loose sense,
“out there” to be known; they are “really real” and
one can get it right about them (and one can get it
wrong, too, as history has shown). With morality,

however, such is not the case. So many students
take it for granted that even the most settled
moral beliefs are not really true in any “hard”
sense, that is, in any sense that would allow one to
say that those who think otherwise are actually
mistaken, that they are in error. Their relativism fits
rather easily with the materialism and
individualism that round out this suite of ideas
that shape so much of their worldview. It also
disposes them to accept some of the more
philosophically elaborated defenses of this
position, leaving them to wonder skeptically what
sort of empirical confirmation can be found for
the belief that something even as odious as slavery
is, in fact, objectively morally wrong. “Where,” they
might learn ask, “would one look, and what would
one need to observe, to confirm (or falsify) this
proposition?” Finally, if what is authentically good
for an individual is simply whatever he or she
asserts to be good based upon personal feelings
and preferences (which surely have been partly
shaped by cultural practices and preferences), on
what grounds could one individual claim that
another’s conception of the good is inadequate, or
even mistaken? Can a preference be mistaken?
What would such an assertion even mean?
With the status of moral “facts” thus settled,
moral beliefs lose objective measure and, with
that, rational force. Contemporary philosopher
and teacher James McBrayer finds this
downgrading of moral beliefs to be rooted in a
dangerous, unsustainable, and demonstrably false
distinction between fact and opinion that has been
woven into the curriculum and culture of so many
elementary and secondary schools. According to
McBrayer, many of our students come to our
institutions believing that a fact is “something that
is true about a subject and can be tested or
proven” and a belief is merely “what someone
thinks, feels, or believes.”23 Over the course of
their primary and secondary education, it becomes
axiomatic to these students that each of our claims
belongs in one, and only one, of these two
categories.24 As soon as the claims of morality are
placed in their proper category, namely that of
belief, the notion that some moral claims could be
true and others false becomes intellectually
unsustainable (and culturally inappropriate). The
fruit of this categorizing and consequent deflating
of moral claims is a moral relativism that
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undermines any serious moral discourse about
what is right and what is good.25
Here is MacIntyre’s “privatization of the good” in
full bloom. Individualism and moral relativism
each contribute to the idea that what is
authentically good for any individual is simply
what that individual determines to be good for
himself or herself, and this determination will be
based upon personal feelings and preferences.
This account of the human good, and its
corollaries in the fields of applied ethics and
public policy, seems to function as common
ground in our students’ moral worldviews,
however inchoate these worldviews may be.
Because it is rarely, if ever, called into question
these students fail to see that this common ground
ultimately reduces to what McIntyre calls “private
arbitrariness.”26
One of the costs of this moral worldview is the
rather stultified moral reasoning that its adherents
often engage in. Many students earnestly endorse
moral propositions regarding substantive human
goods (e.g., Health care is good; we as a people should
promote it.) that, when coupled with their
characteristic default-to-relativism, makes them
vulnerable to a certain kind of manipulation. For
example, in the morally complex field of
biomedical research, proponents of research
projects often employ moral terms in their cases
for public funding. They explain that the proposed
research is aimed at developing cures and
therapies for certain diseases and thus is good and
ought to be supported legally and financially.
Students are often persuaded by such cases and
express support for public policies to protect, and
public funding to facilitate, these endeavors. Yet
when serious moral objections are raised about
some element(s) of an otherwise appealing project
(say, that it calls for creating and experimenting
upon human embryos) many of these same
students summarily dismiss such concerns
because, they point out, moral objections are really
just subjective preferences that must not be
imposed upon others and must not be permitted
to obstruct progress. In this way the culture has
formed these students in such a way that they
constitute easy and reliable support for such
morally problematic research.27

Philosophy, though, can help here. It is the
discipline best equipped to challenge those for
whom moral relativism is the presumptively right
position. Instead of treating relativism as the
enlightened third way above the fray of ongoing
moral disagreement, Philosophy asks, persistently
and in an intellectually demanding way, simple but
profound questions such as “Is moral relativism
true?” and “How does one know it to be true (or
false)?” Furthermore, this discipline teaches us not
to accept any answer simply because it is sincerely
held. Instead, it demands that all answers be
philosophically developed and subjected to
sustained critical scrutiny; reasoning and evidence,
not feeling and popularity, are the standards that
must be met.
James Rachels is one contemporary philosopher
who challenges moral relativism by asking
relativists why a reasonable person ought to
believe their foundational claim that there are no
objective moral truths. Rachels reports that the
answer he would usually receive was something
along the lines of, “Because people disagree on
moral issues.”28 This answer is consistent with the
answer that I have been offered by so many
students throughout my teaching career. Yet,
Rachels presses, how is it that disagreement over a
particular issue is sufficient to show that there is
no objective truth in that area? Perhaps, he offers,
one reason there is disagreement in this area is
that some people are right and others are
mistaken. 29 Such is often the most reasonable
explanation for disagreement in other areas of
human inquiry. Consider history and the various
sciences. The story of each of these disciplines is
rife with disagreement, yet it is not considered a
sign of great wisdom to conclude from this fact
that there is no objective truth in these areas. Yet
so many students find this to be the only
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the fact
of moral disagreement. The inconsistency here is
rather noteworthy, but is a problem of which few
students seem to take note.
Furthermore, Rachels and many others suggest
that the proponents of this standard case for
relativism overstate the nature and depth of the
moral disagreement one observes. Does a bit of
careful study not reveal at least hints of a
historically and culturally transcendent consensus
on at least a few foundational principles (e.g.,
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Friendship is to be respected; Health should be promoted),
a consensus that perhaps points away from
relativism? Assuming that anything short of
unanimity trumps any claim to truth in this area of
inquiry, some thoughtful students might quickly
point to individuals who claim to remain outside
of this putative moral consensus (in my
experience, these individuals are always
hypothetical since the students know no real
deniers of these propositions) as a defeating
counter example. Yet to this granting of vetopower to the (imagined?) gainsayer, 20th century
philosopher Anthony Flew had this to say:
The attempt to show that there is no
philosophical knowledge by simply urging
that there is always someone who can be
relied on to remain unconvinced is a
common fallacy...I called it the ButThere-Is-Always-Someone-Who-WillNever-Agree Diversion.30
In this way philosophy can diagnose and offer
reason-based pushback against the moral
relativism that is orthodoxy among so many of
our students. This particular error leaves no room
for belief in the objectivity and truthfulness of the
moral dimensions of Ignatian ideals like cura
personalis, metanoia, and the Ignatian call to be men
and women for others; it must be challenged if
these elements of our tradition are to be found
credible.
*
Philosophy is a discipline uniquely equipped to
prepare our students to stand athwart the
materialism, individualism, and moral relativism of
our culture. It offers sustained, reason-based
critiques of these cultural presumptions which are
in irreconcilable conflict with some of the deepest
commitments of the Jesuit and Catholic tradition.
Other disciplines—Literature, History, Theology,
etc.—each in their own way can challenge these
errors, but none can do so in the manner of
philosophy. As each of these three errors is, at
bottom, a properly philosophical claim, each is in
need of a properly philosophical challenge.
Furthermore, the Jesuit and Catholic tradition’s
respective alternatives to each of these claims are
in need of robust and properly philosophical
articulation and defense given that each is an

identity-contributing element to this tradition. As
educators in institutions committed to the
Ignatian principles cura personalis, metanoia, the
magis, and finding God in all things, is it not our
obligation to prepare our students to push back
against these harmful and mistaken cultural
presumptions by offering them our tradition’s
richer and more accurate accounts of the person,
the community, and the world?
Consider for a moment just a few of the properly
philosophical questions generated by the familiar
Ignatian ideal cura personalis: What does this phrase
mean? Who counts as a person: the unborn, the
permanently unconscious, the profoundly
disabled? Why? Is cura personalis objectively
obligatory, or merely a suggested way of
proceeding? Is failure to care for the person a
moral failure? What is a moral failure? What is
authentic care? Is there such thing as inauthentic or
false care? By what criteria does one make such a
judgment? Are there authentic human goods? St.
Ignatius believed the answer to this last question
to be “yes.” Plato agreed. In Plato’s Gorgias one
finds Socrates criticizing the orator Gorgias for
pandering to his audience rather than teaching
them about right and wrong. “The difference,”
Socrates explains, “is that pandering pays no
regard to the best interests of its object but
catches fools with the bait of ephemeral pleasure
and tricks them into holding it in the highest
esteem.”31 Socrates goes on to declare this sort of
approach “dishonorable” in that “it makes
pleasure its aim instead of good” and “because it
has no rational understanding of the nature of the
various things it applies to or the person to whom
it applies.”32 Here the great Socrates gestures
toward a philosophical claim that forms part of
the foundation of the Catholic intellectual
tradition, namely, that there are authentic human
goods that are the keys to human well-being, and
that there are false, counterfeit “goods” that tempt
one in the other direction. But is Socrates (and St.
Ignatius) right here? Is this foundational claim, a
claim which anchors the Ignatian notion cura
personalis, true? If so, what are these authentic
human goods that ought to be pursued? These are
among the properly philosophical questions that
must be addressed systematically if one committed
to caring for persons is to be confident that their
obligation is real and that the care they are
providing is authentic. Given this requirement, an
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institution committed to handing on to its
students an understanding of, and developing in
them a sustained commitment to, the Ignatian
ideal cura personalis should see to it that these
students appreciate the philosophical grounds of
this ideal. In doing so, these institutions will be
preparing their students to push back against the
widespread tendency to level all accounts of what
is good and what is right by reducing them all to
mere cultural idiosyncrasy and/or personal
preference.
The foregoing does not come close to exhausting
the ways in which one might trace out the
philosophical dimensions of the notion cura
personalis. Notice that if the good of a particular
thing is determined by the nature of that thing,
then an investigation into the good of the person
will involve an investigation into the nature of the
person. And here again one sees the Ignatian
understanding of the human being to be
conceptually incompatible with the materialism
discussed above. According to the tradition that
Jesuit colleges and universities claim as their own,
the person is (in very broad terms) a body-mind
combination, each part an essential aspect of the
identity of the whole. Care for the person,
therefore, is care for a being whose body is part of
its identity, but which is, at the same time, not
merely a body. The implications of this
philosophical anthropology on what should count
as authentic cura personalis are profound. Following
the Ignatian account, to promote, protect, and
respect the living human body, whether an
embryo, a newborn, a profoundly disabled child,
an aging adult suffering from dementia, etc., is to
promote, protect, and respect the person. Our
students should, at the very least, understand the
nuanced philosophical arguments that underwrite
this position. They should come to see just how
the de-personalization and instrumentalization of
the body on offer in our culture—the renting of
surrogate mothers, the purchasing of organs from
the poor, the banality of sex in a hook-up culture
saturated with pornography, the sexualization of
ever-younger girls, the putative “right” to
physician-assisted suicide, the normalization of
contraception, the laboratory production of
embryonic human beings for experimentation, just
to name a few—are incompatible with this
understanding of the person as essentially, but not
exclusively, a living body always at some particular

stage along the continuum of growth and decline.
The simple and profound philosophical questions
generated by these conflicting anthropologies
should be addressed head on: Which is the more
adequate account?33 Are the practices identified
above consistent with a correct understanding of
the subject who is the object of cura personalis? Do
such practices serve the authentic good of all
those involved? Note, again, that these are
properly philosophical questions, and they
demand properly philosophical attention. If Jesuit
institutions of higher education are going to
recommend our vision of the human person over
that offered by much of contemporary culture,
then it is incumbent upon us to do so in a manner
that is philosophically serious. Here, then, one
finds a crucial and irreplaceable role for
Philosophy in bringing our students to appropriate
the truths of our tradition and take them out to
the culture.
*
The challenge briefly laid out here is nothing new.
It is just the Socratic (and Ignatian) call to the
examined life. As mentioned earlier, there are
many disciplines, each in its distinctive way, which
can challenge our students to examine not only
their own lives but also the life of their
communities and the basic commitments of their
culture. Philosophy has an irreplaceable role here,
too. To diminish the role of this discipline in our
schools is to diminish the preparation we offer to
our students whom we challenge to go and set the
world on fire. This challenge echoes the challenge
that the life of Socrates raises, namely, to do
where they live what he did in Athens: revere truth
and justice, question the prevailing “wisdom” of
the age, irritate, cajole, point to nonsense and call
it nonsense, demand and help find better answers.
The alternative to this understanding of
Philosophy as a friend of cura personalis, metanoia,
etc. is what may be called “Philosophy without
commitment.” This alternative understands
philosophy to be little more than a buffet of ideas
and arguments which equip one to support or to
critique just about any position, depending upon
one’s desires. Philosophy on this model does not
revere truth and justice, does not illuminate cura
personalis, is not animated by the magis, and does
not seek metanoia. Instead, one engaged in this way
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of philosophizing is akin to G. K. Chesterton’s
new rebel. Chesterton writes,
[T]he new rebel is a skeptic, and will not
entirely trust anything. He has no loyalty;
he can never be really a revolutionist. And
the fact that he doubts everything really
gets in his way when he wants to
denounce anything. For all denunciation
implies a moral doctrine of some kind;
and the modern revolutionist doubts not
only the institution he denounces, but the
doctrine by which he denounces it…. In
short, the modern revolutionist, being an
infinite skeptic, is always engaged in
undermining his own mines. In his book
on politics he attacks men for trampling
on morality; in his book on ethics he
attacks morality for trampling on men.
Therefore the modern man in revolt has
become practically useless for all purposes
of revolt. By rebelling against everything
he has lost his right to rebel against
anything.34
Standing in contrast to the role that Philosophy
might play in the new rebel’s life stands the role
that Philosophy plays in the Catholic and Jesuit
tradition. Philosophy in this tradition, one shaped
in part by the ideals and aspirations of cura
personalis, magis, finding God in all things, and metanoia,
is Philosophy with a perspective, with deep
commitments, with a certain orientation. It is
Philosophy that will frequently bump up against,
and can stand up against, the aforementioned
errors of our age. It is not Philosophy as a buffet
of ideas, arguments, and positions that can be
used as needed to manipulate others, to advance
one’s program, to make oneself useful to those
who would pursue lesser things. Instead, it is
philosophy as Socrates practiced it, it is
philosophy in the Ignatian tradition that our
colleges and universities claim as their own.
Within this tradition, both the role and the value
of the study of philosophy far exceed that of
cultivating a set of transferrable intellectual skills
(critical thinking, etc.). This ancient discipline also
offers our students what no other discipline can: a
sustained, direct, and nuanced rational articulation
and defense of the Catholic and Jesuit tradition’s
identity-conferring beliefs and ideals. As our
graduates leave us we know that they head off to a

culture that will often be at odds with all that we
stand for. If we have not prepared them to
withstand these challenges and to be leaven in the
world by exposing the philosophical errors of the
age and offering a better alternative, then we have
not done for them all that we could, and should,
have done. Indeed, one clear measure of the
authenticity and depth of an institution’s
commitment to its Ignatian beliefs and animating
aspirations, and to the well-being of its students, is
that institution’s commitment to Philosophy in its
core curriculum. Maintaining (and restoring, even
expanding, where needed) a central role for
Philosophy in the core curricula of Jesuit colleges
and universities is a necessary element in
authentically living out the mission and identity of
Catholic and Jesuit institutions of higher learning.
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